Commonsense Knowledge, Ontology and Ordinary Language

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Abstract: Over two decades ago a “quite revolution” overwhelmingly replaced knowledge-based approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.

Keywords: Ontology, compositional semantics, commonsense knowledge, reasoning.


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1 INTRODUCTION

Over two decades ago a “quite revolution”, as Charniak (1995) once called it, overwhelmingly replaced knowledge-based approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. In recent years, however, the terms ontology, semantic web and semantic computing have been in vogue, and regardless of how these terms are being used (or misused) we believe that this ‘semantic counter revolution’ is a positive trend since corpus-based approaches to NLP, while useful in some language processing tasks – see (Ng and Zelle, 1997) for a good review – cannot account for compositionality and productivity in natural language, not to mention the complex inferential patterns that occur in ordinary language use. The inferences we have in mind here can be illustrated by the following example:

(1) Pass that car will you.
   a. He is really annoying me.
   b. They are really annoying me.

Clearly, speakers of ordinary language can easily infer that ‘he’ in (1a) refers to the person driving [that] car, while ‘they’ in (1b) is a reference to the people riding [that] car. Such inferences, we believe, cannot theoretically be learned (how many such examples will be needed, and what exactly would constitute a negative example in this context?), and are thus beyond the capabilities of any quantitative approach. On the other hand, and although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP (e.g., Lenat and Guha, 1990) are somewhat justified. While language ‘understanding’ is, for the most part, a commonsense ‘reasoning’ process at the pragmatic level, as example (1) illustrates, the knowledge structures that an NLP system must utilize should have sound linguistic and ontological underpinnings and must be formalized if we ever hope to build scalable systems (or, as John McCarthy once said, if we ever hope to build systems that we can actually understand!). As we have argued elsewhere (Saba, 2007), therefore, we believe that both trends are partly mis-

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guided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. Specifically, we argue that very little progress within logical semantics have been made in the past several years due to the fact that these systems are, for the most part, mere symbol manipulation systems that are devoid of any content. In particular, in such systems where there is hardly any link between semantics and our commonsense view of the world, it is quite difficult to envision how one can “uncover” the considerable amount of content that is clearly implicit, but almost never explicitly stated in our everyday discourse. To illustrate this point further consider the following:

(2) a. Simon is a rock.
   b. The ham sandwich wants a beer.
   c. Sheba is articulate.
   d. Jon bought a brick house.
   e. Carlos likes to play bridge.
   f. Jon enjoyed the book.
   g. Jon visited a house on every street.

Although they tend to use the least number of words to convey a particular thought (perhaps for computational effectiveness, as Givon (1984) once suggested), we argue that speakers of ordinary language understand the sentences in (2) as follows:

(3) a. Simon is [as solid as] a rock.
   b. The [person eating the] ham sandwich wants a beer.
   c. Sheba is [an articulate] person.
   d. Jon bought a brick [-made] house.
   e. Carlos likes to play [the game] bridge.
   g. Jon visited a [different] house on every street.

Clearly, therefore, any compositional semantics must somehow account for this [missing text], since sentences such as those in (2) are quite common, and are not at all exotic, far-fetched, or contrived. Linguists and semanticists have usually dealt with such sentences by investigating various phenomena such as metaphor (3a); metonymy (3b); textual entailment (3c); nominal compounds (3d); lexical ambiguity (3e), co-predication (3f); and quantifier scope ambiguity (3g), to name a few. However, and although they seem to have a common denominator, it is somewhat surprising that in looking at the literature one finds that these phenomena have been studied quite independently; to the point where there is very little, if any, that seems to be common between the various proposals that are often suggested. In our opinion this state of affairs is very problematic, as the prospect of a distinct paradigm for every single phenomenon in natural language cannot be realistically contemplated. Moreover, and as we hope to demonstrate in this paper, we believe that there is indeed a common symptom underlying these (and other) challenging problems in the semantics of natural language.

Before we make our case, let us at this very early juncture suggest this informal explanation for the missing text in (2): SOLID is (one of) the most salient features of a Rock (2a); people, and not a sandwich, have ‘wants’ and EAT is the most salient relation that holds between a Human and a Sandwich (2b); in our everyday discourse, ARTICULATE is a property that is ordinarily said of objects that must be of type Human (2c); MADE-OF is the most salient relation between an Artifact (and thus a House) and a Substance (and thus a Brick) (2d); PLAY is the most salient relation that holds between a Human and a Game (2e); READ is the most salient relationship that holds between a Human and an object that has informational content, such as a Book (2f); and, finally, in the (possible) world that we live in, it is highly unlikely for a House to be located on every Street (2g). The point of this informal explanation is to suggest that the problem underlying most challenges in the semantics of natural language seems to lie in semantic formalisms that employ logics that are mere abstract symbol manipulation systems; systems that are devoid of any ontological content. What we suggest, instead, is a semantics that is grounded in commonsense metaphysics, a semantics that views ‘logic as a language’; that is, a logic that has content, and ontological content, in particular, as has been recently and quite convincingly advocated by Cocchiarella (2001).

In the rest of the paper we will first propose a semantics that is grounded in a strongly-typed ontology – an ontology that reflects our commonsense view of reality and the way we talk about it in ordinary language; subsequently, we will formalize the notion of ‘salient property’ and ‘salient relation’ (as it applies to our proposal). Having done that, in the rest of the paper we will suggest how a strongly-typed compositional system can possibly utilize such information to explain a number complex phenomena in natural language.

2 A TYPE SYSTEM FOR ORDINARY LANGUAGE

The utility of enriching the ontology of propositional logic by introducing variables and quantification is well-known: the valid inference $r = Socrates$ is mortal cannot be obtained in propositional logic from $p = all$ humans are mortal and $q = Socrates$ is a human since $p \land q \Rightarrow r$ is hardly a valid statement in propositional logic. In first-order logic, however, this inference is easily produced, by utilizing the notions of variables and quantification and by exploiting one important aspect of variables, namely, their scope. As will shortly be demonstrated, however, copredication, metonymy

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1 To be sure, there are a number of proposals to the semantics of natural language within the general program of “cognitive linguistics” that do in fact suggest a holistic approach to these phenomena. In stating that these phenomena ‘have been studied quite independently’ we are here exclusively referring to logical semantics, as we believe that logical semantics remains to be the only plausible alternative to adequately account for compositionality, productivity and the complex inferential patterns that are clearly available in natural language.

2 In addition to EAT, a Human can of course also BUY, SELL, MAKE, PREPARE, WATCH, or HOLD, etc; a Sandwich. Why EAT might be a more salient relation between a Person and a Sandwich is a question we shall pay considerable attention to below.
and various other problems that are usually relegated to intensionality in natural language are due the fact that another important aspect of a variable, namely its *type*, has not been exploited. In particular, much like scope connects various predicates within a formula, when a variable has more than one type in a single scope, type unification is the process by which one can discover implicit relationships that are not explicitly stated, but are in fact implicit in the type hierarchy. To begin with, therefore, we shall first introduce a type system that will be assumed in the rest of the paper.

2.1 The Tree of Language

In *Types and Ontology* Fred Sommers (1963) suggested some time ago that there is a strongly typed ontology that seems to be implicit in all that we say in ordinary spoken language, where two objects $x$ and $y$ are considered to be of the same type iff the set of monadic predicates that are significantly predicable of $x$ is equivalent to the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of $y$. Thus, while they make references to four distinct classes (sets of objects), for an ontologist interested in the relationship between ontology and natural language, the noun phrases in (4) are ultimately referring to two types only, namely Cat and Number:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{a. a black cat} \\
&\text{b. an old cat} \\
&\text{c. a small number} \\
&\text{d. a prime number}
\end{align*}\]

In other words, whether we make a reference to a *black cat* or to an *old cat*, in both instances we are ultimately speaking of objects that are of the same type; and this, according to Sommers, is a reflection of the fact that the set of monadic predicates in our natural language that are significantly predicable of 'black cats' is exactly the same set that is significantly predicable of 'old cats'.

Let us say $sp(x,s)$ is true if $s$ is the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of some type $t$, and let $T$ represent the set of all types in our ontology, then

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{(5) Definition: Ontological Types} \\
&a. \, t \in T \equiv (\exists s)(sp(t,s) \land (s \neq \emptyset) \land \neg(\exists u \in T)(sp(u,s))) \\
&b. \, s \prec t \equiv (\exists s_1, s_2)(sp(s, s_2) \land sp(t, s_2) \land (s_1 \subseteq s_2)) \\
&c. \, s = t \equiv (\exists s_1, s_2)(sp(s, s_2) \land sp(t, s_2) \land (s_1 = s_2))
\end{align*}\]

That is, to be a type (in the ontology) is to have a non-empty set of predicates that are significantly predicable (5a); and a type $s$ is a subtype of $t$ iff the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of $s$ is a subset of the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of $t$ (5b); consequently, the identity of a concept is well-defined as given by (5c).

Interestingly, what (5a) suggests seems to be related to what Fodor (1998) meant by "to be a concept is to be locked to a property", in that it seems that a genuine concept (or a Sommers type) is one that 'owns' at least one predicate in the language. Note also that according to (5a), abstract objects such as *events, states, properties, activities, processes*, etc. are also part of our ontology since the set of predicates that is significantly predicable of such objects is not empty. For example, one can always speak of an immanent event, or an event that was cancelled, etc. Similarly, one can always say idle of some state, and one can always speak of starting and terminating a process, etc.

In our representation, therefore, concepts belong to two quite distinct categories: (i) ontological concepts, such as Animal, Substance, Entity, Artefact, Event, State, etc., which are assumed to exist in a subsumption hierarchy, and where the fact that an object of type Human is (ultimately) an object of type Entity is expressed as Human $\prec$ Entity; and (ii) logical concepts, which are the properties (that can be said) of and the relations (that can hold) between ontological concepts. To illustrate the difference (and the relation) between the two, consider the following:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{(6) } r_1 : \text{OLD}(x :: \text{Entity}) \\
&\text{ } r_2 : \text{HEAVY}(x :: \text{Physical}) \\
&\text{ } r_3 : \text{HUNGRY}(x :: \text{Living}) \\
&\text{ } r_4 : \text{ARTICULATE}(x :: \text{Human}) \\
&\text{ } r_5 : \text{MAKE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Artifact}) \\
&\text{ } r_6 : \text{MANUFACTURE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Instrument}) \\
&\text{ } r_7 : \text{RIDE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Vehicle}) \\
&\text{ } r_8 : \text{DRIVE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Car})
\end{align*}\]

The predicates in (6) are supposed to reflect the fact that in ordinary spoken language one can always say OLD of any Entity; that we say HEAVY of objects that are of type Physical; that HUNGRY is said of objects that are of type Living; that ARTICULATE is said of objects that must be of type Human; that MAKE is a relation that can hold between a Human and an Artefact; that MANUFACTURE is a relation that can hold between a Human and an Instrument, etc. Note that the type assignments in (6) implicitly define a type hierarchy as that shown in figure 1 below. Consequently, and although not explicitly stated in (6), in ordinary spoken language one can always attribute the property HEAVY to an object of type Car since Car $\prec$ Vehicle $\prec \cdots \prec$ Physical.

In addition to logical and ontological concepts, there are also proper nouns, which are the names of objects; objects that could be of any type. A proper noun, such as sheba, is interpreted as

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{(7) } \{\text{sheba}\} \\
&\Rightarrow \lambda P[(\exists x)(\text{NOO}(x :: \text{Thing}, \text{sheba}) \land P(x :: t))]
\end{align*}\]

where NOO($x :: \text{Thing}, s$) is true of some individual object $x$ (which could be any Thing), and $s$ if (the label) $s$ is the name of $x$, and $t$ is presumably the type of objects that $P$ applies to (to simplify notation, we will often write (7) as $\{\text{sheba}\} \Rightarrow \lambda P[(\exists \text{sheba :: Thing})(P(\text{sheba :: t}))]$).

Consider now the following, where it is assumed that TEACHER is a property that is ordinarily said of objects that must be of type Human; that is TEACHER(x :: Human), and where BE($x, y$) is true when $x$ and $y$ are the same objects.

---

1 When $a$ is a constant and $P$ is a predicate, $Pa = \exists x [P(x \land (x = a))]$. 
(8) \[\text{sheba is a teacher}\] 
\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\exists x)(\text{TEACHER(sheba :: Human)} \land \text{BE(sheba, x)})\]

This states that there is a unique object named sheba (which is an object that could be any Thing), and some x such that x is a TEACHER (and thus must be an object of type Human), and such that sheba is that x. Since BE(sheba, x), we can replace y by the constant sheba obtaining the following:\footnote{In this case where there is a subsumption relation between the types of objects in question the copular is essentially translated into equality. In other contexts, however, the copular could eventually result in introducing some other implicit relationship that exists between the corresponding ontological types. This issue is discussed briefly later in the paper.}

(9) \[\text{sheba is a teacher}\] 
\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\exists x)(\text{TEACHER}(x :: \text{Human}) \land \text{BE(sheba, x)})\] 
\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\text{TEACHER(sheba :: Human)})\]

Note now that sheba is associated with more than one type in a single scope. In these situations a type unification must occur, where a type unification \((s \odot t)\) between two types \(s\) and \(t\) and where \(Q \in \{\exists, \forall\}\), is defined as follows,

(10) \[[Qx :: (s \odot t)](P(x)) = \begin{cases} 
(Qx :: s)(P(x)), & \text{if } (s \odot t) \\
(Qx :: t)(P(x)), & \text{if } (t \odot s) \\
(Qx :: s)(Qy :: t)(R(x, y) \land P(y)), & \text{if } (\exists R)(R = \text{msr}(s, t)) \\
\bot, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\]

where \(R\) is some salient relation that might exist between objects of type \(s\) and objects of type \(t\). That is, in situations where there is no subsumption relation between \(s\) and \(t\) the type unification results in keeping the variables of both types and in introducing some salient relation between them (we shall discuss these situations below).

Going to back to (9), the type unification in this case is actually quite simple, since \((\text{Human} \preceq \text{Thing})\):

\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\exists x)(\text{TEACHER(sheba :: Human)} \land \text{BE(sheba, x)})\] 
\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\text{TEACHER(sheba :: Human)})\]

In the final analysis, therefore, sheba is a teacher is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named sheba, an object that must be of type Human, such that sheba is a TEACHER. Note here the clear distinction between ontological concepts (such as Human), which Cocchiarella (2001) calls first-intension concepts, and logical (or second-intension) concepts, such as TEACHER(x). That is, what ontologically exist are objects of type Human, not teachers, and TEACHER is a mere property that we have come to use to talk of objects of type Human\footnote{Not recognizing the difference between logical (e.g., TEACHER) and ontological concepts (e.g., Human) is perhaps the reason why ontologies in most AI systems are rampant with multiple inheritance.}. In other words, while the property of being a TEACHER that \(x\) may exhibit is accidental (as well as temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact that some \(x\) is an object of type Human (and thus an Animal, etc.) is not. Moreover, a logical concept such as TEACHER is assumed to be defined by virtue of some logical expression such as \((\forall x :: \text{Human})(\text{TEACHER}(x) \equiv_{df} \varphi)\), where the exact nature of \(\varphi\) might very well be susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at a certain point in time, a certain community considers a TEACHER to be. Specifically, the logical concept TEACHER must be defined by some expression such as

\[\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Human})(\exists a :: \text{Activity})(\text{TEACHING}(a) \land \text{AGENT}(a, x))\]

That is, any \(x\), which must be an object of type Human, is a TEACHER iff \(x\) is the agent of some Activity \(a\), where \(a\) is a TEACHING activity. There are several reasons why a logical concept such as TEACHER must be defined in terms of more basic ontological categories (such as an Activity), some of which will be addressed below. For now it suffices to consider one of these reasons. Consider the following:

\[\text{sheba is a superb teacher}\] 
\[\Rightarrow (\exists \text{sheba} :: \text{Thing})(\text{SUPERB(sheba :: Human)} \land \text{TEACHER(sheba :: Human)})\]

Note that in the above it is sheba, and not her teaching that is considered to be superb. This however is problematic since SUPERB is a property that could also be said of Sheba’s teaching, which is an (abstract) object of type Activity, and thus the definition of TEACHER must admit a variable of type activity as suggested by (12). We shall discuss this issue in
more details below. Before we proceed, however, we need to extend the notion of type unification slightly.

2.2 More on Type Unification

It should be clear by now that our ontology, as defined thus far, assumes a Platonic universe which admits the existence of anything that can be talked about in ordinary language, including abstract objects, such as states, properties, events, etc. This existence, however, is ontological (it merely reflects the possibility of being), and should not be confused with actual existence. The point here, as has also been argued by Cocchiarella (1996), is that reference in ordinary language can be made to (i) ontological concepts; or (ii) to ontological objects (physical as well as abstract) which are instances of the ontological types. Moreover, in ordinary language use reference of the latter kind can happen in two ways: we often make references to objects that may or may not actually exist — i.e., one can make a reference to actual existing objects as well as to objects that might/could have existed, or to objects that might/can exist sometime in the future. To summarize, therefore, it will be assumed here that in ordinary language use one can make a reference to

• a type in the ontology (i.e., to a kind): \( (\exists X :: t)(P(X)) \);
• an object of a certain type, an object that must have an actual (or concrete) existence: \( (\exists X :: t)(P(X^{\text{act}})) \); or
• an object of a certain type, an object that need not actually exist: \( (\exists X :: t)(P(X^{\text{nc}})) \).

Accordingly, and as suggested by Hobbs (1985), the above necessitates that a distinction be made in our logical form between mere being and concrete (or actual) existence. To do this we introduce a predicate, \( \text{Exist}(x) \), which is true when some object \( x \) has a concrete (or actual) existence, and where a reference to an object of some type is initially assumed to be imply mere being, while actual (or concrete) existence is only inferred from the context. The relationship between mere being and concrete existence can be defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(13) \quad & \quad (\exists X :: t)(P(X)) \\
& \equiv (\exists X :: t)(\exists x)((\text{Inst}(x, X) \land \text{Exist}(x) \land P(x)) \\
& \equiv (\exists X :: t)(\forall x)((\text{Inst}(x, X) \land \text{Exist}(x) \supset P(x))
\end{align*}
\]

In (13a) we are simply stating that some property \( P \) is true of some object \( X \) of type \( t \). Thus, while, ontologically, there are objects of type \( t \) that we can speak about, nothing in (13a) entails the actual (or concrete) existence of any such object. In (13b) we are stating that the property \( P \) is true of an object \( X \) of type \( t \), an object that must have a concrete (or actual) existence (and in particular at least the instance \( x \)); which is equivalent to saying that there is some object \( x \) which is an instance of some abstract object \( X \), where \( x \) actually exists, and where \( P \) is true of \( x \). Finally, (13c) states that whenever some \( x \), which is an instance of some abstract object \( X \) of type \( t \) exists, then the property \( P \) is true of \( x \). Thus, while (13a) makes a reference to a kind (or a type in the ontology), (13b) and (13c) make a reference to some instance of a specific type, an instance that may or may not actually exist. To simplify notation, we can henceforth write (13b) and (13c) as follows, respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\exists X :: t)(P(X^{\text{act}})) & \equiv (\exists X :: t)(\forall x)((\text{Inst}(x, X) \land \text{Exist}(x) \supset P(x)) \\
(\exists X :: t)(P(X^{\text{nc}})) & \equiv (\exists X :: t)(\forall x)((\text{Inst}(x, X) \land \text{Exist}(x) \supset P(x))
\end{align*}
\]

Finally it should be noted that \( x \) in (13b) is assumed to have an actual (or concrete) existence assuming that the property/relaion \( P \) is actually true of \( x \). If the truth of \( P(X) \) is just a possibility, then so is the concrete existence of some instance \( x \) of \( X \). Formally, we have the following:

\[
(\exists X :: t)(\text{can}(P(X^{\text{act}}))) \equiv (\exists X :: t)(P^{\text{can}}(X^{\text{nc}}))
\]

Finally, and since different relations and properties have different existence assumptions, the existence assumptions implied by a compound expression is determined by type unification, which is defined as follows, and where the basic type unification \( (s \bullet t) \) is that defined in (10):

\[
\begin{align*}
(x :: (s \bullet t^{\text{nc}})) & = (x :: (s \bullet t)^{\text{nc}}) \\
(x :: (s \bullet t^{\text{nc}})) & = (x :: (s \bullet t)^{\text{nc}}) \\
(x :: (s \bullet t^{\text{nc}})) & = (x :: (s \bullet t)^{\text{nc}})
\end{align*}
\]

As a first example consider the following (where temporal and modal auxiliaries are represented as superscripts on the predicates):

\[
(14) \quad [\text{Jon needs a computer}] \\
\Rightarrow (3' \text{ jon :: Human})(3X :: \text{ Computer}) \\
(\text{NEED}^{\text{does}}_{\text{Jon}}(\text{jon}, X :: \text{ Thing}))
\]

In (14) we are stating that some unique object named \( \text{Jon} \), which is of type \( \text{Human} \) does \text{NEED} something we call \text{Computer}. While needing a computer does not entail its existence, actually fixing one does, as the following suggests:

\[
(15) \quad [\text{Jon fixed a computer}] \\
\Rightarrow (3' \text{ jon :: Human})(3X :: \text{ Computer}) \\
(\text{FIX}^{\text{did}}_{\text{Jon}}(\text{jon}, X :: \text{ Thing})) \\
\Rightarrow (3' \text{ jon :: Human})(3X :: (\text{Computer} \bullet \text{ Thing}^{\text{nc}})) \\
(\text{FIX}^{\text{did}}_{\text{Jon}}(\text{jon}, X)) \\
\Rightarrow (3' \text{ jon :: Human})(3X :: \text{ Computer}^{\text{nc}}) \\
(\text{FIX}^{\text{did}}_{\text{Jon}}(\text{jon}, X))
\]

\[\text{Again, it must be emphasized here that actual or concrete existence should not be confused with physical (or tangible) objects that can be located in space/time. Abstract objects (such as events, states, processes, etc.) also may or may not have actual existence. For example, my trip to Manila is an event that did not (although it may one day) actually exist. My visit to Frankfurt in 2008, however, was an actual entity with many properties that I am more than ready to fully describe.}\]
our ontology reflects the commonsense fact that we can always speak of an 

\( \exists x :: \text{Computer} \)

\((\text{Exist}(x) \land \text{FIX}_{\text{dis}}^{\text{fix}}(j, x))\)

That is, ‘jon fixed a computer’ is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named jon, which is an object of type Computer, and some \( x \) of type Computer (an \( x \) that actually exists) such that jon did fix \( x \). Thus, if jon did actually fix a computer, then a computer must exist. However, consider now the following:

\[
(\exists z :: \text{Computer})
\]

\((\exists x :: \text{Computer})

\((\text{fix}_{\text{can}}^{\text{can}}(j, x))\)

Essentially, therefore, ‘jon can fix a computer’ is stating that whenever an object \( x \) of type Computer exists, then jon can fix \( x \); or, equivalently, that ‘jon can fix any computer’.

Finally, consider the following, where it is assumed that our ontology reflects the commonsense fact that we can always speak of an Animal that did CLIMB a Physical object:

\[
(\exists x :: \text{Snake})
\]

\((\exists y :: \text{Tree})

\((\text{CLIMB}_{\text{can}}^{\text{can}}(x, y) \land \text{Physical}_{\text{can}}^{\text{can}}(y)))\)

That is, ‘a snake can climb a tree’ is essentially interpreted as any snake (if it exists) can climb any tree (if it exists).

With this background, we now proceed to tackle some interesting and challenging problems in the semantics of natural language.

3 SEMANTICS WITH ONTOLOGICAL CONTENT

In this section we discuss several problems in the semantic of natural language and demonstrate the utility of a semantics embedded in a strongly-typed ontology, an ontology that is assumed to reflect our commonsense view of reality and the way we take about it in ordinary language.

3.1 Types, Polymorphism and Nominal Modification

We first demonstrate the role type unification and polymorphism plays in nominal modification. Consider the sentence in (1) which could be uttered by someone who believes that: (i) Olga is a dancer and a beautiful person; or (ii) Olga is beautiful as a dancer (i.e., Olga is a dancer and she dances beautifully).

(17) Olga is a beautiful dancer

As suggested by Larson (1998), there are two possible routes to explain this ambiguity: one could assume that a noun such as ‘dancer’ is a simple one place predicate of type \( \{e,t\} \) and ‘blame’ this ambiguity on the adjective; alternatively, one could assume that the adjective is a simple one place predicate and blame the ambiguity on some sort of complexity in the structure of the head noun (Larson calls these alternatives A-analysis and N-analysis, respectively).

In an A-analysis, an approach advocated by Siegel (1976), adjectives are assumed to belong to two classes, termed predicative and attributive, where predicative adjectives (e.g., red, small, etc.) are taken to be simple functions from entities to truth-values, and are thus extensional and intersective: \([\text{Adj Noun}] = [\text{Adj}] \cap [\text{Noun}]\). Attributive adjectives (e.g., former, previous, rightful, etc.), on the other hand, are functions from common noun denotations to common noun denotations — i.e., they are predicate modifiers of type \( \langle (e, t), (e, t) \rangle \), and are thus intensional and non-intersective (but subjective: \([\text{Adj Noun}] \subseteq [\text{Noun}]\)). On this view, the ambiguity in (17) is explained by posting two distinct lexemes (beautiful and beautiful₁) for the adjective beautiful, one of which is an attributive while the other is a predicative adjective. In keeping with Montague’s (1970) edict that similar syntactic categories must have the same semantic type, for this proposal to work, all adjectives are initially assigned the type \( \langle (e, t), (e, t) \rangle \) where intersective adjectives are considered to be subtypes obtained by triggering an appropriate meaning postulate. For example, assuming the lexeme beautiful₁ is marked (for example by a lexical feature such as +INTERSECTIVE), then the meaning postulate \( \exists P \forall Q \forall x \langle \text{BEAUTIFUL}_{\text{can}}(Q)(x) = P(x) \land Q(x) \rangle \) would yield an intersective meaning when \( P \) is beautiful₁; and where a phrase such as ‘a beautiful dancer’ is interpreted as follows°:

\[
(\exists x :: \text{Dancer})
\]

\((\exists y :: \text{BEAUTIFUL}_{\text{can}}^{\text{can}}(\text{DANCER}_{\text{can}}^{\text{can}}(x, y) \land P(x))\)

While it does explain the ambiguity in (17), several reservations have been raised regarding this proposal. As Larson (1995; 1998) notes, this approach entails considerable duplication in the lexicon as this means that there are ‘doubles’ for all adjectives that can be ambiguous between an intersective and a non-intersective meaning. Another objection, raised by McNally and Boleda (2004), is that in an A-analysis there are no obvious ways of determining the context in which a certain adjective can be considered intersective. For example, they suggest that the most natural reading of (18) is the one where beautiful is describing Olga’s dancing, although it does not modify any noun and is thus wrongly considered intersective by modifying Olga.

° Note that as an alternative to meaning postulates that specialize intersective adjectives to \( \langle e, t \rangle \), one can perform a type-lifting operation from \( \langle e, t \rangle \) to \( \langle (e, t), (e, t) \rangle \) (see Partee, 2007).
(18) Look at Olga dance. She is beautiful.

While valid in other contexts, in our opinion this observation does not necessarily hold in this specific example since the resolution of ‘she’ must ultimately consider all entities in the discourse, including, presumably, the dancing activity that would be introduced by a Davidsonian representation of ‘Look at Olga dance’ (this issue is discussed further below).

A more promising alternative to the A-analysis of the ambiguity in (17) has been proposed by Larson (1995, 1998), who suggests that beautiful in (17) is a simple interpretive adjective of type <e,t> and that the source of the ambiguity is due to a complexity in the structure of the head noun. Specifically, Larson suggests that a deverbal noun such as dancer should have the Davidsonian representation

\[ \exists \forall \exists \forall (\text{DANCER}(x) \iff (\exists e) (\text{DANCING}(e) \land \text{AGENT}(e, x))) \]  

i.e., any x is a dancer iff x is the agent of some dancing activity (Larson’s notation is slightly different). In this analysis, the ambiguity in (1) is attributed to an ambiguity in what beautiful is modifying, in that it could be said of Olga or her dancing Activity. That is, (17) is to be interpreted as follows:

\[ \text{\textbf{[Olga is a beautiful dancer]}} \Rightarrow (\exists e) (\text{DANCING}(e) \land \text{AGENT}(e, \text{olga}) \land (\text{BEAUTIFUL}(e) \lor \text{BEAUTIFUL}(\text{olga}))) \]

In our opinion, Larson’s proposal is plausible on several grounds. First, in Larson’s N-analysis there is no need for impromptu introduction of a considerable amount of lexical ambiguity. Second, and for reasons that are beyond the ambit of beautiful in (17), and as argued in the interpretation of example (12) above, there is ample evidence that the structure of a deverbal noun such as dancer must admit a reference to an abstract object, namely a dancing Activity; as, for example, in the resolution of ‘that’ in (19).

(19) Olga is an old dancer.
She has been doing that for 30 years.

Furthermore, and in addition to a plausible explanation of the ambiguity in (17), Larson’s proposal seems to provide a plausible explanation for why ‘old’ in (4a) seems to be ambiguous while the same is not true of ‘elderly’ in (4b): ‘old’ could be said of Olga or her teaching; while elderly is not an adjective that is ordinarily said of objects that are of type activity:

(20) a. Olga is an old dancer.
b. Olga is an elderly teacher.

With all its apparent appeal, however, Larson’s proposal is still lacking. For one thing, and it presupposes that some sort of type matching is what ultimately results in rejecting the subsective meaning of elderly in (20b), the details of such processes are more involved than Larson’s proposal seems to imply. For example, while it explains the ambiguity of beautiful in (17), it is not quite clear how an N-Analysis can explain why beautiful does not seem to admit a subsective meaning in (21).

(21) Olga is a beautiful young street dancer.

In fact, beautiful in (21) seems to be modifying Olga for the same reason the sentence in (22a) seems to be more natural than that in (22b).

(22) a. Maria is a clever young girl.
b. Maria is a young clever girl.

The sentences in (22) exemplify what is known in the literature as adjective ordering restrictions (AORs). However, despite numerous studies of AORs (e.g., see Wulff, 2003; Teodorescu, 2006), the slightly differing AORs that have been suggested in the literature have never been formally justified. What we hope to demonstrate below however is that the apparent ambiguity of some adjectives and adjective-ordering restrictions are both related to the nature of the ontological categories that these adjectives apply to in ordinary spoken language. Thus, and while the general assumptions in Larson’s (1995; 1998) N-Analysis seem to be valid, it will be demonstrated here that nominal modification seems to be more involved than has been suggested thus far. In particular, it seems that attaining a proper semantics for nominal modification requires a much richer type system than currently employed in formal semantics.

First let us begin by showing that the apparent ambiguity of an adjective such as beautiful is essentially due to the fact that beautiful applies to a very generic type that subsumes many others. Consider the following, where we assume BEAUTIFUL(x :: Entity); that is that beautiful can be said of any Entity:

\[ \text{\textbf{[Olga is a beautiful dancer]}} \Rightarrow (\exists a) (\text{DANCING}(a) \land \text{AGENT}(a, \text{olga}) \land (\text{BEAUTIFUL}(a) \lor \text{BEAUTIFUL}(\text{olga}))) \]

Note now that, in a single scope, a is considered to be an object of type Activity as well as an object of type Entity, while Olga is considered to be a Human and an Entity. This, as discussed above, requires a pair of type unifications, (Human • Entity) and (Activity • Entity). In this case both type unifications succeed, resulting in Human and Activity, respectively:

\[ \text{\textbf{[Olga is a beautiful dancer]}} \Rightarrow (\exists a :: \text{Human}) (\exists a :: \text{Activity}) \land (\text{BEAUTIFUL}(a) \lor \text{BEAUTIFUL}(\text{olga}))) \]

In the final analysis, therefore, ‘Olga is a beautiful dancer’ is interpreted as: Olga is the agent of some dancing Activity, and either Olga is BEAUTIFUL or her DANCING (or, of course, both). However, consider now the following, where ELDERLY is assumed to be a property that applies to objects that must be of type Human:
Figure 2. Adjectives as polymorphic functions

The diagram illustrates how adjectives can be treated as polymorphic functions that apply to objects at various types and levels. For example, the adjective "beautiful" can be used with different types of objects, such as "beautiful car" or "beautiful dancer," and its meaning can depend on the type of the object.

3.2 Adjective Ordering Restrictions

Assuming \textsc{beautiful}(x :: \textit{Entity}) - i.e., that \textit{beautiful} is a property that can be said of objects of type \textit{Entity}, then it is a property that can be said of a \textit{Cat}, a \textit{Person}, a \textit{City}, a \textit{Movie}, a \textit{Dance}, an \textit{Island}, etc. Therefore, \textsc{beautiful} can be thought of as a polymorphic function that applies to objects at several levels and where the semantics of this function depend on the type of the object, as illustrated in figure 2 below. Thus, and although \textsc{beautiful} applies to objects of type \textit{Entity}, in saying 'a beautiful car', for example, the meaning of \textit{beautiful} that is accessed is that defined in the type \textit{Physical} (which could in principle be inherited from a supertype). Moreover, and as is well known in the theory of programming languages, one can always perform type casting upwards, but not downwards (e.g., one can always view a \textit{Car} as just an \textit{Entity}, but the converse is not true)\textsuperscript{9}.

Thus, and assuming also that \textsc{red}(x :: \textit{Physical}) - that is, assuming that \textsc{red} can be said of Physical objects, then, for example, the type casting that will be required in (23a) is valid, while that in (23b) is not.

\begin{align*}
(23) & \quad \text{a. } \textsc{beautiful}(\textsc{red}(x :: \textit{Physical}) :: \textit{Entity}) \\
& \quad \text{b. } \textsc{red}(\textsc{beautiful}(x :: \textit{Entity}) :: \textit{Physical})
\end{align*}

This, in fact, is precisely why 'Jon owns a beautiful red car', for example, is more natural than 'Jon owns a red beautiful car'. In general, a sequence \(A_1(A_2(x :: s) :: t)\) is a valid sequence iff \(s < t\). Note that this is different from type unification, in that the unification does succeed in both cases in (11). However, before we perform type unification the direction of the type casting must be valid. For example, consider the following:

\[
[\textit{Olga is a beautiful young dancer}]
\]

\textsuperscript{8} It is perhaps worth investigating the relationship between the number of meanings of a certain adjective (say in a resource such as WordNet), and the number of different functions that one would expect to define for the corresponding adjective.

\textsuperscript{9} Technically, the reason we can always cast up is that we can always ignore additional information. Casting down, which entails adding information, is however undecidable.
(25) a. \[ j\text{o}n\text{ found a unicorn}\] 
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists x) (\text{UNICORN}(x) \land \text{FIND}(j, x)) \]

b. \[ j\text{o}n\text{ sought a unicorn}\] 
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists x) (\text{UNICORN}(x) \land \text{SEEK}(j, x)) \]

Note that \((\exists x) (\text{UNICORN}(x))\) can be inferred in both cases, although it is clear that ‘\text{jon sought a unicorn}’ should not entail the existence of a unicorn. In addressing this problem, Montague (1960) suggested treating seek as an intensional verb that more or less has the meaning of ‘tries to find’; i.e. a verb of type \(\langle(e, t), t\rangle\) , using the tools of a higher-order intensional logic. To handle contexts where there are intensional as well as extensional verbs, mechanisms such as the ‘type lifting’ operation of Partee and Rooth (1983) were also introduced. The type lifting operation essentially coerces the types into the lowest type, the assumption being that if ‘\text{jon sought and found}’ a unicorn, then a unicorn that was initially sought, but subsequently found, must have concrete existence.

In addition to unnecessary complication of the logical form, we believe the same intuition behind the ‘type lifting’ operation, which, as also noted by (Kehler \textit{et al.}, 1995) fails in mixed contexts containing more than tow verbs, can be captured without the a priori separation of verbs into intensional and extensional ones, and in particular since most verbs seem to function intensionally and extensionally depending on the context. To illustrate this point further consider the following, where it is assumed that PAINT\((x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Physical})\); that is, that the object of paint does not necessarily (although it might) exist:

(26) \[ j\text{o}n\text{ painted a dog}\] 
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: \text{Dog}) \]
\[ (\text{PAINT}^{\text{d}}(j :: \text{Human}, D :: \text{Physical})) \]
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: (\text{Dog} \circ \text{Physical})) \]
\[ (\text{PAINT}^{\text{d}}(j, D)) \]
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: (\text{Dog} \circ \text{Physical})) \]
\[ (\text{PAINT}^{\text{d}}(j, D)) \]

Thus, ‘\text{jon painted a dog}’ simply states that some unique object named \text{jon}, which is an object of type Human painted something we call a Dog. However, let us now assume OWN\((x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Entity}^c)\); that is, if some Human owns some \text{y} then \text{y} must actually exist. Consider now all the steps in the interpretation of ‘\text{jon painted his dog}’:

(27) \[ j\text{o}n\text{ painted his dog}\] 
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: \text{Dog}) \]
\[ (\text{OWN}(j :: \text{Human}, D :: \text{Physical})^c) \]
\[ \land (\text{PAINT}(j :: \text{Human}, D :: \text{Entity})) \]
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: (\text{Dog} \circ \text{Physical}^c \circ \text{Entity})) \]
\[ (\text{PAINT}(j, D)) \]
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: (\text{Dog} \circ \text{Physical}^c \circ \text{Entity})) \]
\[ (\text{OWN}(j, D) \land \text{PAINT}(j, D)) \]
\[ \Rightarrow (\exists j) (\text{Human}(j)) (\exists D :: (\text{Dog}^c \circ \text{Physical}^c \circ \text{Entity})) \]
\[ (\text{OWN}(j, D) \land \text{PAINT}(j, D)) \]
Thus, painting something does not entail its existence, while owning something does, and the type unification of the conjunction yields the desired result. As given by the rules concerning existence assumptions given in (13) above, the final interpretation of (27) is now the following:

\[
\text{\textit{[Jon painted his dog]}} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Human}) (\exists d :: \text{Dog}) \\
(\text{Exist}(d) \land \text{OWN}(j \text{on}, d) \land \text{PAINT}(j \text{on}, d))
\]

That is, ‘Jon painted his dog’ is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named Jon, which is an object of type Human, and some d which is an object of type Dog, such that d exists, and Jon owns d, and Jon painted d. The point of the above example was to illustrate that the notion of extensional verbs can be captured in this simple formalism without the type lifting operation, particularly since an extensional interpretation might at times be implied even if the ‘intensional’ verb does not coexist with an extensional verb in the same context. As another example, let us assume PLAN(x :: Human, y :: Event); that is, that it always makes sense to say that some Human is planning (or did plan) something we call an Event. Consider now the following,

(28)
\[
\text{\textit{[Jon planned a trip]}} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists e :: \text{Trip}) \\
(\text{PLAN}(j \text{on :: Human, e :: Event})) \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists e :: \text{(Trip ∩ Event)}) (\text{PLAN}(j \text{on, e})) \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists e :: \text{Trip}) (\text{PLAN}(j \text{on, e}))
\]

That is, ‘Jon planned a trip’ simply states that a specific object that must be a Human has planned something we call a Trip (a trip that might not have actually happened\(^{10}\)). Assuming EXHAUSTING(e :: Event\(^{2c}\)) , however, i.e., that EXHAUSTING is a property that is ordinarily said of an (existing) Event, then the interpretation of ‘Jon planned the exhausting trip’ should proceed as follows:

(29)
\[
\text{\textit{[Jon planned the lengthy trip]}} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Human}) (\exists e :: \text{Trip}) \\
(\text{PLAN}(j \text{on, e :: Event}) \land \text{EXHAUSTING}(e :: \text{Event\(^{2c}\)}))
\]

Since (Trip ∩ (Event ∩ Event\(^{2c}\))) = (Trip ∩ Event\(^{2c}\)) we finally get the following:

\[
(\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists e :: \text{Trip\(^{2c}\})} \\
(\text{PLAN}(j \text{on, e :: Event}) \land \text{EXHAUSTING}(e))
\]

Since (Trip ∩ (Event ∩ Event\(^{2c}\))) = (Trip ∩ Event\(^{2c}\)) we finally get the following:

\[
(\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists e :: \text{Trip}) \\
(\text{PLAN}(j \text{on, e :: Event}) \land \text{Exist}(e) \land \text{EXHAUSTING}(e))
\]

That is, there is a specific Human named Jon that has planned a Trip, a trip that actually exists, and a trip that was EXHAUSTING. Finally, it should be noted here that the trip in (29) was finally considered to be an existing event due to other information contained in the same sentence. In general, however, this information can be contained in a larger discourse. For example, in interpreting ‘John planned the trip. It was exhausting,’ the resolution of ‘it’ would force a retraction of the types inferred in processing ‘John planned the trip’, as the information that follows will ‘bring down’ the aforementioned trip from mere being to actual (or concrete) existence. This subject is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but readers interested in the computational details of such processes are referred to (van Deemter & Peters, 1996).

### 3.4 Metonymy and Copredication

In addition to so-called intensional verbs, our proposal seems to also appropriately handle other situations that, on the surface, seem to be addressing a different issue. For example, consider the following:

(30) Jon read the book and then he burned it.

In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that this is an example of what they term copredication; which is the possibility of incompatible predicates to be applied to the same type of object. It is argued that in (30), for example, ‘book’ must have what is called a dot type, which is a complex structure that in a sense carries the ‘informational content’ sense (which is referenced when it is being read) as well as the ‘physical object’ sense (which is referenced when it is being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to ‘pick out’ the right sense in the right context, and all in a well-typed compositional logic. But this approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of the word ‘book’ in ordinary language\(^{11}\). Moreover, copredication seems to be a special case of metonymy, where the possible relations that could be implied are in fact much more constrained. An approach that can explain both notions, and hopefully without introducing much complexity into the logical form, should then be more desirable.

Let us here suggest the following:

(31) a. READ(x :: Human, y :: Content) \\
b. BURN(x :: Human, y :: Physical)

That is, we are assuming here that speakers of ordinary language understand ‘read’ and ‘burn’ as follows: it always makes sense to speak of a Human that read some Content, and of a Human that burned some Physical object. Consider now the following:

(32) [Jon read a book and then he burned it]
\[
\Rightarrow (\exists j \text{on :: Entity}) (\exists b :: \text{Book}) \\
(\text{READ}(j \text{on :: Human, b :: Content}) \land \text{BURN}(j \text{on :: Human, b :: Physical}))
\]

The type unification of Jon is straightforward, as the agent of READ and BURN are of the same type. Concerning b, a

\(^{10}\) Note that it is the Trip (event) that did not necessarily happen, not the planning (ACTIVITY) for it.

\(^{11}\) Similar presuppositions are also made in a hybrid (connectionist/symbolic) ‘sense modulation’ approach described in (Rais-Ghasem & Corrieu, 1998).
pair of type unifications \((\text{Book} \bullet \text{Physical}) \bullet \text{Content})\) must occur, resulting in the following:

\[\begin{align*}
(33) & \quad \text{\{}jon \text{ read a book and then he burned it\}} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{HamSandwich}) (\exists y :: \text{Beer}) \\
& \quad \quad (\text{WANT}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Thing})) \\
& \quad \quad (\text{READ} (\text{jon} :: \text{Entity}) (\exists b :: \text{Book}) (\exists c :: \text{Content}) \\
& \quad \quad \quad (R(b, c) \land \text{BURN}(\text{jon}, b))
\end{align*}\]

Since no subsumption relation exists between Book and Content, the two variables are kept and a salient relation between them is introduced, resulting in the following:

\[\begin{align*}
(34) & \quad \text{\{}jon \text{ read a book and then he burned it\}} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{HamSandwich}) (\exists y :: \text{Book}) (\exists c :: \text{Content}) \\
& \quad \quad (R(b, c) \land \text{READ}(\text{jon}, c) \land \text{BURN}(\text{jon}, b))
\end{align*}\]

That is, there is some unique object of type Human (named jon), some Book \(b\), some content \(c\), such that \(c\) is the Content of \(b\), and such that jon read \(c\) and burned \(b\).

As in the case of copredication, type unifications introducing an additional variable and a salient relation occurs also in situations where we have what we refer to as metonymy. To illustrate, consider the following example:

\[\begin{align*}
(35) & \quad \text{\{}the ham sandwich wants a beer\} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{HamSandwich}) (\exists y :: \text{Beer}) \\
& \quad \quad (\text{WANT}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Thing})) \\
& \quad \quad (\text{READ} (\text{jon} :: \text{Entity}) (\exists b :: \text{Book}) (\exists c :: \text{Content}) \\
& \quad \quad \quad (R(b, c) \land \text{READ}(\text{jon}, c) \land \text{BURN}(\text{jon}, b))
\end{align*}\]

While the type unification between \(\text{Beer}\) and \(\text{Thing}\) is trivial, since \((\text{Beer} \prec \text{Thing})\), the type unification involving the variable \(x\) fails since there is no subsumption relationship between Human and HamSandwich. As argued above, in these situations both types are kept and a salient relation between them is introduced, as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
(36) & \quad \text{\{the ham sandwich wants a beer\}} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{HamSandwich}) (\exists z :: \text{Human}) (\exists y :: \text{Beer}) \\
& \quad \quad (R(x, z) \land \text{WANT}(z, y))
\end{align*}\]

where \(R = \text{msr}(\text{Human}, \text{Sandwich})\), i.e., where \(R\) is assumed to be some salient relation (e.g., \(\text{EAT}, \text{ORDER}\), etc.) that exists between an object of type Human, and an object of type Sandwich (more on this below).

### 3.5 Types and Salient Relations

Thus far we have assumed the existence of a function \(\text{msr}(s, t)\) that returns, if it exists, the most salient relation \(R\) between two types \(s\) and \(t\). Before we discuss what this function might look like, we need to extend the notion of assigning ontological types to properties and relations slightly. Let us first reconsider (1), which is repeated below:

\[\begin{align*}
(36) & \quad \text{Pass that car, will you.} \\
& \quad \quad \text{a. He is really annoying me.} \\
& \quad \quad \text{b. They are really annoying me.}
\end{align*}\]

As discussed earlier we argue that most readers take ‘he’ in (36a) as a reference to ‘the person driving [that] car’ while ‘they’ in (36b) as a reference to ‘the people riding in [that] car’. The question here is this: although there are many possible relations between a Person and a Car (e.g., DRIVE, RIDE, MANUFACTURE, DESIGN, MAKE, etc.) how is it that DRIVE is the one that most speakers assume in (36a), while RIDE is the one most speakers would assume in (36b)? Here’s a plausible answer:

- DRIVE is more salient than RIDE, MANUFACTURE, DESIGN, MAKE, etc. since the other relations apply higher-up in the hierarchy; that is, the fact that we MAKE a Car, for example, is not due to Car, but to the fact that MAKE can be said of any Artifact and that (\(\text{Car} \prec \text{Artifact}\)).

While DRIVE is a more salient relation between a Human and a Car than RIDE, most speakers of ordinary English understand the DRIVE relation to hold between one Human and one Car (at a specific point in time), while RIDE is a relation that holds between many (several, or few!) people and one car. Thus, ‘they’ in (36b) fails to unify with DRIVE due to cardinality constraints, and thus the next most salient relationship must be picked-up, which in this case is happens to be RIDE.

In other words, the types assignments of DRIVE and RIDE are understood by speakers of ordinary language as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{DRIVE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Car}) \\
\text{RIDE}(x :: \text{Human}, y :: \text{Car})
\end{align*}\]

With this background, let us now suggest how the function \(\text{msr}(s, t)\) that picks out the most salient relation \(R\) between two types \(s\) and \(t\) is computed.

We say \(\text{pap}(P, t)\) when the property \(P\) applies to objects of type \(t\), and \(\text{rap}(R, s, t)\) when the relation \(R\) holds between an object of type \(s\) and an object of type \(t\). We define a list \(\text{lrap}(t)\) of all properties that apply to objects of type \(t\), and \(\text{lrap}(s, t)\) of all relations that hold between objects of type \(s\) and objects of type \(t\), as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
(37) & \quad \text{lrap}(t) = [p \mid \text{pap}(P, t)] \\
& \quad \text{lrap}(s, t) = [(R, m, n) \mid \text{rap}(R, s, t)]
\end{align*}\]

The lists (of lists) \(\text{lrap}^*(t)\) and \(\text{lrap}^*(s, t)\) can now be inductively defined as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
(38) & \quad \text{lrap}^*(t) = \text{lrap}^*(\text{Thing}) = [\ ] \\
& \quad \text{lrap}^*(t) = \text{lrap}(t) = \text{lrap}(\text{sup}(t)) \\
& \quad \text{lrap}^*(s, t) = \text{lrap}(s, t) = \text{lrap}(s, \text{sup}(t))
\end{align*}\]

where \((e :: s)\) is a list that results from attaching the object \(e\) to the front of the (ordered) list \(s\), and where \(\text{sup}(t)\) returns the immediate (and single!) parent of \(t\). Finally, we now define the function \(\text{msr}(s, t)\) which returns most the
salient relation between objects of type \(a\) and \(t\), with constraints \(m\) and \(n\), respectively, as follows:

\[
msr(\langle s'', t'' \rangle) = \text{if } (S \neq \emptyset) \text{ then } (\text{head } S) \text{ else } \perp
\]

where

\[
S = \left[ \{l : (r, a, b) \in \text{lap}''(s, t) \land (a \geq m) \land (b \geq n)\} \right]
\]

Assuming now the ontological and logical concepts shown in figure 1, for example, then

\[
l\text{pap}''(\text{Human}) = \left[ \text{[ARTICULATE, ..., [HUNGRY, ..., [HEAVY, ..., [OLD, ..., ...
\right]
\]

\[
l\text{pap}''(\text{Human, Car}) = \left[ \{(\text{DRIVE, }1, 1), ..., (\text{RIDE, }1^*, 1), ..., ...
\right]
\]

Since these lists are ordered, the degree to which a property or a relation is salient is inversely related to the position of the property or the relation in the list. Thus, for example, while a Human may DRIVE, RIDE, MAKE, BUY, SELL, BUILD, etc. a Car, DRIVE is a more salient relation between a Human and a Car than RIDE, which, in turn, is more salient than MANUFACTURE, MAKE, etc. Moreover, assuming the above sets and the definition of \(msr\) we have

\[
msr(\langle \text{Human}, Car' \rangle) = \text{DRIVE}
\]

\[
msr(\langle \text{Human}'', Car' \rangle) = \text{RIDE}
\]

which essentially says DRIVE is the most salient relation in a context where we are speaking of a single Human and a single Car, and RIDE is the most salient relation between a number of people and a Car. Note now that ‘they’ in (36b) can be interpreted as follows:

\[
\left[\text{They are annoying me}\right]
\]

\[
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{they} :: (\text{Human}'' \bullet \text{Car}))(\exists \text{me} :: \text{Human}'')
\]

\[
\text{(ANNOYING)(they, me)}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{they} :: \text{Human}'')(\exists \text{c} :: \text{Car})(\exists \text{me} :: \text{Human}'')
\]

\[
(\text{RIDING}(\text{they}, \text{c}) \land \text{ANNOYING}(\text{they}, \text{me}))
\]

It should be clear from the above that type unification and computing the most salient relation between two (ontological) types is what determines that Jon enjoyed ‘reading’ the book in (39a), and enjoyed ‘watching’ the movie in (39b).


b. Jon enjoyed the movie.

Note however that in addition to READ, an object of type Human may also WRITE, BUY, SELL, etc. a Book. Similarly, in addition to WATCH, an object of type Human may also CRITICIZE, DIRECT, PRODUCE, etc. a Movie.

(40) a. William H. Bonney is Billy the Kid.

b. Liz is famous.

The copular ‘is’ in (40a) is usually considered to be the ‘is of identity’ while that in (40b) the ‘is of predication’ and the standard first-order logic translation of the sentences in (40) is usually given by (41a) and (41b), respectively (using \(w\)b for William H. Bonney and \(b\)k for Bill the Kid):

\[
(41) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{EQ}(\text{whb, btk}) \\
\text{b. } & \text{Famous(Liz)}
\end{align*}
\]

However, we argue that ‘is’ is not ambiguous but, like any other relation, it can occur in contexts in which an additional salient relation is implied, depending on the types of the objects involved. Thus, we suggest the following interpretation for (40a):

\[
(42) \begin{align*}
\left[\text{whb is btk}\right] \\
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{whb} :: \text{Human})(\exists \text{btk} :: \text{Human})(\text{BE}(\text{whb, btk})) \\
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{whb} :: \text{Human})(\exists \text{btk} :: \text{Human})(\text{EQ}(\text{whb, btk}))
\end{align*}
\]

That is, since both objects are of the same type, \(\text{BE}\) in (42) is trivially translated into identity. However, consider now the following:

\[
(43) \begin{align*}
\left[\text{liz is famous}\right] \\
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{liz} :: \text{Human})(\exists \text{p} :: \text{Property}) \\
(\text{FAME}(\text{p}) \land \text{BE}(\text{liz, Human, p} :: \text{Property}))
\end{align*}
\]

Since \(\text{BE}(\text{liz, p})\) some relationship must exist between \(\text{liz}\) and \(p\). Since no subsumption relation exists between Human and Property, some salient relation must be introduced, where the most salient relation between an object \(x\) and a property \(y\) is \(\text{HAS}(x, y)\), meaning that \(x\) has the property \(y\):

\[
(44) \begin{align*}
\left[\text{liz is famous}\right] \\
\Rightarrow (\exists \text{liz} :: \text{Human}) \\
(\exists \text{p} :: \text{Property})(\text{FAME}(\text{p}) \land \text{HAS}(\text{liz, p}))
\end{align*}
\]
Thus, saying that ‘Liz is famous’ is essentially equivalent to saying that there is some unique object named Liz, an object of type Human, and some Property p (namely, FAME), and such that Liz has the property p. A similar analysis yields the following interpretations:

\[(44)\]
\[
a. \text{[aging is inevitable]} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Process})(\exists y :: \text{Property}) \\
(Aging(x) \land \text{INEVITABILITY}(y) \lor \text{HAS}(x, y))
\]
\[
b. \text{[fame is desirable]} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Property})(\exists y :: \text{Property}) \\
(FAME(x) \lor \text{DESIRABILITY}(y) \land \text{HAS}(x, y))
\]
\[
c. \text{[sheba is dead]} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Human})(\exists y :: \text{State})(\text{DEATH}(y) \land \text{IN}(x, y))
\]
\[
d. \text{[jon is aged]} \\
\Rightarrow (\exists j :: \text{Human})(\exists y :: \text{Process})(\text{AGING}(y) \land \text{GT}(x, y))
\]

That is, the Process of Aging has the Property of being Inevitable (44a); the Property FAME has the (other) Property of being Desirable (44b); sheba is in a (physical) State called Death (44c); and, finally, jon is going through (GT) a Process called Aging (44d). Finally, consider the following example (due, we believe, to Barbara Partee):

\[(45)\]
\[
a. \text{The temperature is 90.} \\
b. \text{The temperature is rising.} \\
c. 90 is rising.
\]

It has been argued that such sentences require an intensional treatment since a purely extensional treatment would make (54a) and (54b) erroneously entail (54c). However, we believe that the embedding of ontological types into the properties and relations yields the correct entailments without the need for complex higher-order intensional formalisms. Consider the following:

\[(48)\]
\[
[\text{the temperature is rising}] \\
\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Temperature})(\exists y :: \text{Process}) \\
(\text{RISING}(y) \land \text{GT}(x, y))
\]

Note now that (46) and (48) yield the following, which essentially says that ‘the temperature is 90 and it is rising’:

\[(49)\]
\[
\Rightarrow (\exists x :: \text{Temperature})(\exists y :: \text{Measure})(\exists z :: \text{Process}) \\
(\text{RISING}(z) \land \text{VALUE}(y, 90) \land \text{HAS}(x, y) \land \text{GT}(z, x))
\]

Finally, note that uncovering the ontological commitments implied by the sentences in (45a) and (54b) will not result in the erroneous entailment of (45c).

Contrary to the situation in (45), however, uncovering the ontological commitments implied by some sentences should sometimes admit some valid entailments (as opposed to blocking unwarranted inferences). For example, consider the following:

\[(49)\]
\[
a. \text{exercising is wise.} \\
b. \text{jon is exercising.} \\
c. \text{jon is wise.}
\]

Clearly, (49a) and (49b) should entail (49c), although one can hardly think of attributing the property wise to an Activity (EXERCISING). Let us see how we might explain this argument. We start with the simplest:

\[(50)\]
\[
\Rightarrow (\exists j :: \text{Human})(\exists \text{ACT} :: \text{Activity}) \\
(\text{EXERCISING}(\text{ACT}) \land \text{AGENT}(\text{ACT}, \text{jon}))
\]

That is, there is a unique object of type Human, an object named jon, and a object act of type Activity, such that act is an EXERCISING Activity, and such that jon is the agent of that activity. Let us now consider the following:

\[(51)\]
\[
\Rightarrow (\forall a :: \text{Activity})(\text{EXERCISING}(a)) \\
(\text{WISDOM}(p) \land \text{HAS}(a :: \text{Human}, p))
\]

This says that any exercising Activity has a property, namely wisdom, which is a property that is ordinarily said of an object that must be of type Human has. Note now that a type unification concerning the variable a must occur as it is being considered, in a single scope, to be an object of type Human as well as an object of type Activity:
The most salient relation between a Human and an Activity is that of agency – that is, a human is typically the Agent of an activity:

\[
\exists a :: \text{Activity} \land \forall x :: \text{Human} \land \text{EXERCISING}(a) \land \text{AGENT}(a, x) \land \exists p :: \text{Property} \land (\text{WISDOM}(p) \land \text{HAS}(a, p))
\]

Essentially, therefore, we get the following: any human \( x \) has the property of being wise whenever \( x \) is the agent of an exercising Activity. Note now that (50), (53) and modes ponens results in the following (which is the meaning of ‘jon is wise’):

\[
\exists s :: \text{Human} \land (\exists p :: \text{Property} \land (\text{WISDOM}(p) \land \text{HAS}(s, p))
\]

Finally, note that the inference in (49) was proven valid only after uncovering the missing text, since ‘exercising is wise’ was essentially interpreted as ‘[any human that performs the activity of] exercising is wise’.

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

If the main business of semantics is to explain how linguistic constructs relate to the world, then semantic analysis of natural language text is, indirectly, an attempt at uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense knowledge, and particularly the background knowledge that seems to be implicit in all that we say in our everyday discourse. While this intimate relationship between language and the world is generally accepted, semantics (in all its paradigms) has traditionally proceeded in one direction: by first stipulating an assumed set of ontological commitments followed by some machinery that is supposed to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that stipulated structure of reality.

With the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological commitments of our semantic formalisms and the reality of the world these formalisms purport to represent, it is not surprising therefore that challenges in the semantics of natural language are rampant. However, as correctly observed by Hobbs (1985), semantics could become nearly trivial if it was grounded in an ontological structure that is “isomorphic to the way we talk about the world”. The obvious question however is ‘how does one arrive at this ontological structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday discourse?’ One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the semantic analysis of natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard we strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states:

We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and then construct a meaning-theory in light of the answers. We should investigate how our language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable systematic description of how it functions; the answers to those questions will then determine the answers to the metaphysical ones.

What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to understand the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language and everyday commonsense knowledge, one could, as also suggested in (Bateman, 1995), “use language as a tool for uncovering the semantic ontology of commonsense” since ordinary language is the best known theory we have of everyday knowledge. To avoid this seeming circularity (in wanting this ontological structure that would trivialize semantics; while at the same time suggesting that semantic analysis should itself be used as a guide to uncovering this ontological structure), we suggested here performing semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, in the hope of building up the ontology as we go guided by the results of the semantic analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus constructed as a result of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to ontology (e.g., Lenat, & Guha (1990); Guarino (1995); and Sowa (1995)), but would instead be discovered from what is in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday discourse; (ii) the semantics of several natural language phenomena should as a result become trivial, since the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying knowledge structures (in a sense, the semantics would have been done before we even started!)

Throughout this paper we have tried to demonstrate that a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language can be easily tackled if semantics is grounded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. Our ultimate goal, however, is the systematic discovery of this ontological structure, and, as also argued in Saba (2007), it is the systematic investigation of how ordinary language is used in everyday discourse that will help us discover (as opposed to invent) the ontological structure that seems to underlie all what we say in our everyday discourse.

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